Merger Bonds: A New Remedy for an Old Problem

Authors

  • Brandon Schaufele

Abstract

Merger control is beset with uncertainty. Mergers promise to unlock potential economic efficiencies yet introduce the prospect that the newly merged firms may behave anti-competitively. Denying a merger for which efficiencies outweigh anti-competitive harm forgoes socially beneficial combinations. The opposite is equally true: approving a merger that yields few efficiencies but leads to anti-competitive conduct harms consumers. Competition authorities, as regulators, must weigh the probabilities of these future outcomes, potential efficiencies versus potential anti-competitive conduct, when making an ex-ante decision whether to challenge a transaction. That is, they must take a decision before the uncertainty is resolved. This paper introduces a novel behavioural remedy, referred to as a merger bond, that may help alleviate and transfer some of the risks arising from ex-ante merger control. Merger bonds are financial contracts that act as assurances against anti-competitive conduct, bridging the gap between ex-ante and ex-post merger review. They offer several advantages that complement existing merger control remedies.

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Published

2023-06-21

How to Cite

Schaufele, B. (2023). Merger Bonds: A New Remedy for an Old Problem. Canadian Competition Law Review, 36(1). Retrieved from https://cclr.cba.org/index.php/cclr/article/view/834